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Note

"Visible Marks" Insurance
Exclusion Clauses
Cochran v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 201 Neb. 631,
271 N.W.2d 331 (1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cochran v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.1 the Supreme Court
of Nebraska considered the validity of the "visible marks of forcible entry" variety of insurance policy exclusions. 2 The court affirmed the validity of this type of exclusion while adhering to its
3
opinion in Hazuka v. Maryland Casualty Co.
In upholding the defendant insurer's denial of liability in
1. 201 Neb. 631, 271 N.W.2d 331 (1978).
2. The "visible marks" exclusion in the plaintiff's policy read as follows:
HOMEOWNER'S POLICY-BROAD FORM
SECTION I
DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY AND INTERESTS COVERED
PERILS INSURED AGAINST
11. Theft, meaning any act of stealing or attempt thereat, including
loss of property from a known place under circumstances when a
probability of theft exists.
c. Theft Exclusions applicable to property away from the described
premises:
This policy does not apply to loss away from the described premises
of: . . .

(2) Property while unattended in or on any motor vehicle or
trailer, other than a public conveyance unless the loss is the result of
forcible entry into such vehicle while all doors, windows or other
openings thereof are closed and locked, provided there are visible
marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of such vehicle or the loss is
the result of the theft of such vehicle which is not recovered within
thirty days, but property shall not be considered unattended when
the insured is required to surrender the keys of such vehicle to a
bailee; ....
Record, vol 1, at 29-30 (Exhibit A), Cochran v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 201 Neb.
631, 271 N.W.2d 331 (1978).
3. 183 Neb. 336, 160 N.W.2d 174 (1968). This was an action to recover a loss
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Hazuka and Cochran, the court enunciated the following philosophies regarding "visible marks" exclusions: that as a general rule
these exclusion clauses are not ambigious; 4 that they are coverage
provisions that limit the liability of the insurer; that they are not an
attempt to determine the character of evidence to show liability;5
and, that they are not unconscionable. 6 The extreme brevity of the
opinion in Cochran leaves the status of the doctrines of unconscionability and reasonable expectations regarding insurance policies
in Nebraska in considerable doubt. A close examination of
Cochran, in light of the rationale outlined in Hazuka and set
against the background of recent "visible marks" exclusion decisions in other jurisdictions, reveals the underpinnings of the
Nebraska Supreme Court's current position on these doctrines.
II. THE FACTS OF COCHRAN
On June 16, 1976, plaintiff was insured by a homeowner's insurance policy which contained a "Coverage C, Unscheduled Personal
Property Provision." This provision contained a general theft
clause which excluded '"property while unattended in or on any
motor vehicle... unless the loss is the result of forcible entry into
such vehicle while all doors, windows and other openings thereof
are closed and locked, provided there are visible marks offorcible
,7
entry upon the exterior of such vehicle ....
Plaintiff alleged that his station wagon was parked at his place
of employment with all the doors, windows and other openings

4.
5.
6.
7.

alleged to have occurred under the provisions of a safe burglary policy of insurance. The policy provision provided that"Safe Burglary" means (1) the felonious abstraction of insured property from within a vault or safe described in the declarations and located within the premises by a person making felonious entry into
such vault or such safe and any vault containing the safe, when all
doors thereof are duly closed and locked by all combination locks
thereon, provided such entry shall be made by actual force and violence, of which force and violence there are visible marks made by
tools, explosives, electricity or chemicals upon the exterior of (a) all
of said doors of such vault or such safe and any vault containing a
safe, if entry is made through such doors, or (b) the top, bottom or
walls of such vault or such safe and any vault containing the safe
through which entry is made, if not made through such doors, or (2)
the felonious extraction of such safe from within the premises.
183 Neb. at 339, 160 N.W.2d at 177.
201 Neb. at 634, 271 N.W.2d at 333; 183 Neb. at 341, 160 N.W.2d at 177.
201 Neb. at 634, 271 N.W.2d at 333; 183 Neb. at 339-41, 160 N.W.2d at 177.
201 Neb. at 634, 271 N.W.2d at 333.
Id. at 632, 271 N.W.2d at 332 (emphasis added). For full text of policy provisions, see note 2 supra.
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closed and locked. 8 He stated that on numerous occasions he carried tools, hardware and other personal property in the vehicle. 9
At some point after 1:30 p.m., on June 16, 1976, the automobile was
removed from this location, and plaintiff reported the vehicle stolen. It was discovered by several children the same afternoon a
few miles from where it had been parked, 10 in the middle of a cornfield." The tools were missing from the car and a "jiggle" key was
found in the ignition switch. The insured, a locksmith and
hardwareman, testified as an expert witness on his own behalf that
a jiggle key is a type of key used to gain entry into cars by proper
and knowledgeable manipulation of the key. The plaintiff stated
that entry to and removal of the tools from the car had been gained
by use of the jiggle key. 12 It was his opinion that the thieves, having been scared away by the children playing in the cornfield, ap13
parently forgot to remove the jiggle key from the ignition.
The case was originally tried in municipal court and judgment
was rendered for the defendant insurer. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to the district court. The defendant's position
was that since there were no visible marks of forcible entry on the
exterior of the vehicle, 14 the "visible marks" exclusion exempted
coverage. The district court found that the use of the jiggle key
constituted a forcible entry, but held that the defendant was entitled to rely upon the exclusion because there were no "visible
marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of the vehicle."'15 The
plaintiff then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court and urged
that forced entry through use of a jiggle key should have come
within the coverage of the policy.
III.

DECISION OF THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT

In Cochran,the plaintiff relied principally upon the case of C. &
J. Fertilizer,Inc. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,1 6 in which the
Iowa Supreme Court construed similar "visible marks" language
in a policy covering burglary losses. In Allied, the court allowed
recovery under the policy although there were no visible marks of
forcible entry on the exterior doors, basing its decision on the doctrines of reasonable expectations of the insured, unconscionabil8. Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Brief for Appellee at 4, Cochran v. MFA Mutual Ins.
Co., 201 Neb. 631, 271 N.W.2d 331 (1978).
9. Brief for Appellant at 6.
10. 201 Neb. at 632, 271 N.W.2d at 332-33.
11. Brief for Appellant at 7.
12. 201 Neb. at 633, 271 N.W.2d at 333.
13. Brief for Appellant at 7.
14. 201 Neb. at 633, 271 N.W.2d at 333.
15. Brief for Appellant at 3.
16. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).

1980]

INSURANCE EXCLUSION CLAUSES

ity, and breach of an implied warranty. 17 The plaintiff had relied
upon a line of cases holding such exclusions ambigious, and mere
attempts to determine the character of evidence required to prove
the burglary was not an inside job.'8
The Nebraska Supreme Court devoted one paragraph of its
opinion to the principles of C. & J. Fertilizer. The court then
quoted language from Hazuka v. Maryland Casualty Co. to
demonstrate that such "visible marks" requirements were justifiably intended to be a limitation on liability and not an attempt to
determine the character of evidence to show liability. According to
the court, such limited liability provisions were not ambiguous and
therefore left no room for the rule that insurance contracts be construed most favorably to the insured. 19
The court then pronounced that a theft exclusion in a homeowner's policy applicable to property away from the described
premises with a "visible marks" exclusion, was "unambigious and
the provision requiring visible marks of forced entry [was] not unconscionable. '20 The court gave no suggestion as to what type of
provisions would be ambigious or unconscionable.
IV.

ANALYSIS

On its face, the Cochran decision appears to leave the hapless
insured saddled with an extremely harsh result. The "jiggle" key
left in the ignition, buttressed by the uncontradicted expert testimony regarding use of such a key 2l appear to be sufficient proof
that a theft occurred and that the insured should have recovered.
However, a detailed analysis of the rationale behind such "visible
marks" exclusion clauses demonstrates that the court was correct
in its decision, but failed to give an adequate explanation. The following discussion will contrast the doctrines favoring and opposing such "visible marks" exclusions and outline how the courts
have construed them.
A.

Doctrines Opposing "Visible Marks" Exclusions

The four major doctrines in opposition to "visible marks" exclusions are: (1) reasonable expectations, (2) rule of evidence, (3)
unconscionability, and (4) implied warranty.
17. Id.
18. See Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan. 459,370 P.2d 379 (1962); Rosenthal v. American Bonding Co., 124 N.Y.S. 905 (1910), affid, 143 App. Div.
362, 128 N.Y.S. 553 (1911), rev'd, 207 N.Y. 162, 100 N.E. 716.
19. 201 Neb. at 634, 271 N.W.2d at 333.
20. Id.
21. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
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The doctrine of reasonable expectations provides that a contract of insurance will be construed to provide the coverage that
was reasonably expected by the insured, even if a painstaking
study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations. 22 The Restatement of Contracts provides the following analysis of the doctrine of reasonable expectations:
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and are
bound by them without even appearing to know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond the range of
reasonable expectation. A debtor who delivers a check to his creditor with
the amount blank does not authorize the insertion of an infinite figure.
Similarly, a party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does
not assent to a term if the other party has reason to believe that the adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the
agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption
may be shown by the prior negotiations or inferred from the circumstances. Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is
bizzare or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard
terms explicitedly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or
otherwise hidden from view. This rule was closely related to the policy
against unconscionable
terms and the rule of interpretation against the
23
draftsman.

The central issue in this reasonable expectations doctrine is
what is "reasonable." Is it reasonable for an insured to expect that
his homeowner's policy covers theft of items from his automobile?
Is it reasonable to believe that any such recovery would be contingent upon evidence of24"visible marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of the vehicle?"
The complexity and length of the average insurance policy is
the foundation of this reasonable expectations doctrine, 25 which
works to rescue the insured from fine print exclusions that deny
expected coverage. 26 An insured might reasonably anticipate a
policy requirement of visual evidence indicating the burglary was
an "outside", not an "inside job, '27 but it is unlikely that he would
22. Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237, Comment f, at 540-41 (Tent.
Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
24. See policy provisions at note 2 supra.
25.
Some courts, recognizing that very few insureds even try to read and
understand the policy or application, have declared that the insured
is justified in assuming that the policy which is delivered to him has
been faithfully prepared by the company to provide the protection
against the risk which he had asked for.... Obviously this judicial
attitude is a far cry from the old motto 'caveat emptor.'
7 WLLSTON ON CONTRACTS § 900, at 33-34 (3d ed. 1963).
26. Id.
27. C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d at 177. The court
continued as follows: 'The exclusion in issue [a "visible marks" exclusion],
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anticipate a physical requirement of marks on the vehicle.
It is interesting to note that the court in Cochran did not mention the doctrine of reasonable expectations in its opinion or its
discussion of the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in C. & J. Fertilizer, even though this was the first and foremost doctrine discussed by the Iowa court. The coverage of "certain" thefts from
automobiles 28 in the Cochran homeowner's policy coupled with
the evidence of the jiggle key indicate that the reasonable expectations doctrine would have applied if the Nebraska Supreme Court
had desired to adopt it.
The second doctrine typically relied upon by insureds in "visible marks" exclusion cases is one through which this type of exclusion is intended to be a mere rule of evidence. 29 The majority of
30
jurisdictions have not followed this "rule of evidence" doctrine.
The rationale behind it is that the insurance companies implement
this type of exclusion to protect themselves from "inside jobs" and
frauds. 31 Consequently, there should be coverage only if there is
sufficient evidence to dispell any "inside job" or fraud contention.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Cochran and Hazuka followed
the majority position in denying that "visible marks" exclusions
stating that these exclusions were
were merely rules of evidence, 32
actually limitations on liability.
In Cochran,the Nebraska Supreme Court summarily dismissed
the third doctrine opposing "visible marks" exclusions, that of unconscionability, by stating that "the provision requiring visible
masking as a definition, makes insurer's obligation to pay turn on the skill of
the burglar, not on the event the parties bargained for. a bonafide third party

28.

29.

30.
31.

32.

burglary resulting in loss of plaintiff's chemicals and equipment." Id. For a
discussion of the rule of evidence doctrine, see text accompanying notes 28-32
infra.
For specific policy provisions, see note 2 supra. Coverage was provided for
property while attended in or on any motor vehicle or trailer and coverage
was provided if there were "visible marks of forcible entry upon the exterior"
of an unattended vehicle. Id.
See Rosie O'Grady's Warehouse, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 319 So. 2d
632, 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Lichtentag v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 250
So. 2d 105, 107 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Artress v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 221
Tenn. 636, 639, 429 S.W.2d 430, 432 (1968); Continental Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 58
Tenn. App. 316, 319,430 S.W.2d 661, 662 (1968). Contra,Kretschmer's House of
Appliances, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 410 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Ky.
1966).
See note 29 supra.
See Kretschmer's House of Appliances, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 410 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1966); Ferguson v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 189 Kan.
459, 470 P.2d 379 (1962); Edgar's Warehouse, Inc. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 375 Mich. 598, 134 N.W.2d 746 (1965); 10 CoucH ON INSURANCE LAW
§ 42.129 (2d ed. 1962).
See text accompanying notes 45-51 infra.
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marks of forced entry is not unconscionable." 33 In C. & J. Fertilizer
however, the primary decision analyzing this theory, the Iowa
court devoted more discussion to this doctrine. While construing a
policy covering burglary losses, the Iowa court discussed various
policy arguments underlying the unconscionability doctrine regarding the fine print provisions, 34 standardized contracts offered
on an "accept this or get nothing basis, '35 and weakness in the bargaining process. 36 The Iowa court endorsed the policy of selective
37
elimination of unconscionable provisions in insurance contracts
and suggested that "[w] hen it is claimed or appears to the court
that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, '38
purpose and effect to aid the
court in making the determination.
The plaintiff's evidence in C. & J. Fertilizer demonstrated that
the "visible marks" exclusion was unconscionable. The defendant
offered no evidence to show whether the exclusion was a reasonpolicy. As a result,
able limitation on the protection offered in the
39
the court held the exclusion unconscionable.
In C. & J. Fertilizerthe court also held that the burglary insurance policy provided by the defendant breached an implied warranty of fitness for its intended purpose.4 0 The opinion initially
analyzed implied warranties for particular purposes for goods sold
under the auspices of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court
then attempted to bridge the long gap from the Uniform Commercial Code concept of "goods" to the entity of insurance policies
with the following "protection" concept of insurance policies:
The final and perhaps most significant characteristic of insurance contacts differentiating them from ordinary, negotiated commercial contract,
is the increasing tendency of the public to look upon the insurance policy
The typical applicant
not as a contract but as a special form of chattel.
41
buys "protection" much as he buys groceries.

Justice Legrand, in his dissenting opinion, vigorously opposed
the majority's attempted transposition of the Uniform Commercial
201 Neb. at 634, 271 N.W.2d at 333.
227 N.W.2d at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 181 (quoting IowA CODE § 554.2302(2) (1967) (Iowa Uniform Commercial Code)).
39. Id. For further information concerning the doctrine of unconscionability, see
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,83 HARv.
L REV. 961 (1970).
40. 227 N.W.2d at 177-79.
41. Id. at 178 (quoting 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 900, at 34 (3d ed. 1963)).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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Code provisions. 42 The dearth of authority supporting this application of the implied warranty doctrine to insurance policies demonstrates that the Nebraska Supreme Court was justified in not
mentioning the implied warranty doctrine in its Cochran opinion.
As evidenced above, the jurisdictions opposing "visible marks"
exclusions are akin to the proverbial pioneers of the law, at times
venturing into the wilderness only to be met by the arrows of criticism. The following analysis of doctrines favoring "visible marks"
exclusions will demonstrate that 4the
opponent "Pioneers" defi3
nitely hold the minority viewpoint.
B.

Doctrines Favoring "Visible Marks" Exclusions

The primary doctrines favoring "visible marks" exclusions are
those of (1) limitation on liability, and (2) mysterious disappearance coverage.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have held that "visible marks" exclusion provisions are not ambiguous.44 This con42.

These same observations should dispose of plaintiff's claim of
implied warranty, a theory incidentially for which there is no case
authority at all. The majority apparently seeks to bring insurance
contracts within the ambit of the Uniform Commercial Code governing sales of goods. I believe the definitional section of the Code
itself precludes that notion. See § 554.2105, The Code. This should
put an end to the majority's argument that buying insurance protection is the same as buying groceries. The complete absence of support from other jurisdictions would also suggest it is indefensible.
227 N.W.2d at 184 (dissenting opinion).
43.
It is not uncommon for insurance companies to include in their
burglary or theft policies a provision that there exist visible marks or
visible evidence of force and violence in effecting a felonious entry.
Such a provision is inserted for the protection of the insurer and
clearly favors the insurer over the insured. Since it is ordinarily held
that such a provision is unambiguous, the rule requiring construction
in favor of the insured does not apply.
The policy requirement has been considered as a limitation on the
liability of the insurer or as a rule characterizing the evidence upon
which liability must be predicated, but in either event, the validity of
the requirement has rarely been questioned, although in at least one
instance such a requirement has been held in contravention of public
policy under the particular terms of the policy involved and the particular circumstances involved.
Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 129, 131 (1965) (footnotes omitted). See also Annot.,
2 A.L.R.3d 809 (1965).
44. See American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Llewellyn, 142 Ga. App. 824, 237 S.E.2d 227
(1977); Limberis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 A.2d 83 (Me. 1970); Hazuka v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 183 Neb. 336, 160 N.W.2d 174 (1968); Flatow v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 618, 289 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1968); Clemmons v.
Glen Falls Ins. Co., 2 N.C. App. 479, 163 S.E.2d 425 (1968); Artress v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 221 Tenn. 636, 429 S.W.2d 430 (1968). Contra, United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Woodward, 118 Ga. App. 591, 164 S.E.2d 878
(1968) (The policy's definition of safe burglary required that there be forcible
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cept is significant in that it is the stepping-stone to the doctrine of
limited liability, which is the key doctrine favoring "visible marks"
exclusions. Reflecting this view, the Nebraska court has stated:
It is not every burglary which constitutes a basis for liability, but a burglary as defined in the contract of insurance. The languageof the contract
is not unclearor ambiguous and consequently does not require construction. It is therefore to be given effect in accordance with the ordinary and
generally accepted meaning of its words. It is not a policy which insures
against mysterious disappearance,nor does it cover manual operation of
the safe's combination in the absence of visible evidence of the use of
force thereon. It establishesliability under the insuringclause of the contract only for loss of property extracted from a safe which has been duly
locked by use of a combination or time lock, has been entered by force and
violence, and as a result of the force and violence there is visible evidence
upon the exterior doors or outer walls of the safe of that force and violence
45
which either affected the entry or contributed to effecting the entry.

Since the majority of courts have determined that visible marks
exclusions are not ambiguous, several jurisdictions have construed
such exclusions as limitations on liability or coverage provisions as
opposed to rules of evidence 4 6 This limitation on liability, or coverage approach, assumes that the insurer was attempting to restrict coverage rather than define the amount of evidence needed
to preclude recovery for "inside jobs" and frauds.
The insurer's desire to limit coverage is understandable. It is a
matter of universal knowledge that articles in automobiles are
more likely to be stolen than those located in a home.4 7 Moreover,
many models of automobiles are more susceptible to theft than
others since there are various degrees of lock-security: 48
With these well-known facts in mind, it is quite logical and understandable that an insurer might be quite willing to insure the contents of an
automobile which could not be entered except by force as would mar the
exterior, but would be unwilling to insure the contents of an automobile
the cost of the insurwhich could be entered with far less effort. Certainly
4
ance on the latter risk would be justifiably higher.

This limitation on liability doctrine is the foundation of the Ne-

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

and violent entry, but coverage under the policy included loss "by safe burglary or attempt thereat." Id. at 594, 164 S.E.2d at 880. This language created
ambiguity since presumably loss would not occur from an attempt where
there was no actual entry by force and violence).
Hazuka v. Maryland Cas. Co., 183 Neb. at 341, 160 N.W.2d at 178 (emphasis
added).
See Lichtentag v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 105 (La. Ct. App. 1971);
Hazuka v. Maryland Cas. Co., 183 Neb. 336, 160 N.W.2d 174 (1968); Artress v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 221 Tenn. 636, 429 S.W.2d 430 (1968). For the discussion of the "rule of evidence" doctrine, see text accompanying notes 28-32
supra.
Continental Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 58 Tenn. App. 316, 322-23, 430 S.W.2d 661, 664
(1968).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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braska court's approach to "visible marks" exclusions in Cochran
and Hazuka.50 The court explicitly stated that "[s]uch [a] limited
liability provision is not ambiguous and there is no room for the
rule that insurance contracts will be construed most favorably to
the insured."' 1 The court also stated that the insurance policy in
question was "not a policy which insures against mysterious disappearances, '' 52 the second doctrine favoring "visible marks" exclusions.
Generally, to recover on a policy insuring against theft or burglary, something more than the fact that the property is missing
must be shown. 53 An obvious example is a requirement of "visible
marks of forcible entry upon the exterior of the vehicle."5' Occasionally, burglary or theft insurance policies contain a provision
that the mere disappearance of the insured object shall not be
deemed evidence that the loss was due to theft or burglary. 5 This
was the situation in Raff v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co.,56 where
the Nebraska Supreme Court defined "mysterious disappearance"
under the terms of a theft policy as "disappearance under unknown, puzzling, and baffling circumstances which arouse wonder,
or under circumstances which are difficuriosity, or speculation,
57
cult or hard to explain."
The mysterious disappearance coverage referred to in
Hazuka 58 covers the insured for thefts of the mysterious disappearance character. The following is an example of such a mysterious disappearance clause: "The word 'theft' includes larceny,
burglary and robbery. Mysterious disappearance of any insured
property shall be presumed to be due to theft."5 9 If an insured
wishes to assure himself of coverage, he should purchase an insur50. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
51. 201 Neb. at 634, 271 N.W.2d at 333. See Hazuka v. Maryland Cas. Co., 183 Neb.
at 341, 160 N.W.2d at 177 (quoting Swanson, Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp.,
343 Mo. 350, 121 S.W.2d 783 (1938)).
52. 183 Neb. at 341, 160 N.W.2d at 178.
53. 44 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance § 1399 (1969); 5 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcCE § 3173.25 (rev. 5th ed. 1970).
54. See note 2 supra.
55. 44 Am. Jun. 2d Insurance§ 2047 (1969); 5 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 53, § 3173.25.
56. 181 Neb. 444, 149 N.W.2d 52 (1967). The material provisions in the farmers and
ranchers insurance policy were as follows: "(f) Theft and overturn. This insurance is extended to include direct loss by theft (but excluding escape,
mysterious disappearance,inventory shortages, wrongful conversion and
embezzlement), and overturn." Id. at 445, 149 N.W.2d at 54 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 447, 149 N.W.2d at 55. For further discussion of mysterious disappearance insurance, see Annot., 12 AJ.LR.3d 865 (1967); 22 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 291
(1965).
58. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
59. Kelly, "Mysterious Disappearance"Defined, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 72 (1961).
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ance policy with such a mysterious disappearance clause. The
mysterious disappearance itself should then be sufficient evidence
to recover under the policy. This would avoid having to depend
upon a requirement for visible marks of force and violence similar
to that found in Cochran.
C.

Construction of "Visible Marks" Clauses

If the insured's policy does not contain mysterious disappearance coverage and instead has a "visible marks" exclusion, and a
theft occurs, the battle has just begun. What degree of evidence is
sufficient to overcome the "visible marks" exclusion? Courts have
pondered over: the degree of force required;60 whether exterior or
interior marks are required;61 whether the property must be in the
vehicle; what constitutes "in the vehicle; '62 and the effect of using
a master key or picking a lock. 63 These decisions illustrate that the

60.

61.

62.

63.

This mysterious disappearance coverage is available at low cost as a rider to
many conventional homeowner's policies.
See Ross v. Travelers Indem. Co., 325 A.2d 768 (Me. 1974) (no particular degree of force is a prerequisite-the only requirement is that whatever force
was used must be illegitimate); Klein & Brown, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
59 Misc. 2d 395, 299 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1969), rev'd per curiam, 64 Misc. 2d 908, 316
N.Y.S.2d 552 (1970) (picking lock with instrumentality which left "numerous,"
"pronounced" and "distinctive" marks on cylinder amounted to force and violence within the policy language); Weldcraft Equip. Co. v. Crum & Forster
Ins. Cos., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 420, 312 A.2d 68 (1973) ("little marks" indicated
the use of actual force and violence and met the requirement that there be
visible marks made by tools).
See Gray v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 4 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 283 N.E.2d 261 (1972) (entrance to service station was gained by punching hole through walls separating restroom from storage area; restroom wall was not part of the "exterior"
of premises, therefore recovery on the policy was denied); Klein & Brown,
Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 59 Misc. 2d 395, 299 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1969), rev'd per
curiam, 64 Misc. 2d 908, 316 N.Y.S. 552 (1970) (cylinder lock installed on exterior entrance of premises was part of "exterior" of premises); Continental
Ins. Co v. Cooper, 58 Tenn. App. 316, 430 S.W.2d 661 (1968) (fact that exterior
door of automobile was ajar, that glove compartment had been jimmied open,
that glove compartment lock was inoperative and that mud was on rear seat
did not satisfy requirement of visible marks on "exterior" of automobile).
See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Spector, 303 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
("visible marks upon the exterior of vehicle" language only applied to locked
luggage compartments and not to entire vehicle); Juarez v. General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 320 So. 2d 277 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (coverage not
afforded to loss resulting from theft of luggage from factory-installed luggage
rack on insured's automobile which had no luggage compartment).
See Johnson v. Pacific Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 878, 52 Cal. Rpt. 76 (1966)
(opening of padlock with a key is not the force and violence contemplated by
the policy); Offutt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 251 Md. 262, 247 A.2d 272 (1968)
(picking lock or using master key did not constitute "forcible entry"); Weldcraft Equip. Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 225 Pa. Super. Ct. 420, 312 A.2d 68
(1973) (if lock is picked or even if the key designed to fit the lock has been
used, there has been an application of force).
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ultimate determination of coverage depends upon the individual
policy language and the particular facts and circumstances of each
situation.
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Cochran and Hazuka indicate a conservative
stance by the Nebraska Supreme Court on "visible marks" exclusion clauses. The court has taken a firm position that such "visible
marks" exclusions are a limitation on liability, not a mere rule of
evidence; that such clauses are unambiguous; and consequently,
that they will not trigger the rule that insurance contracts should
be construed in favor of the insured.
The status of the doctrines of reasonable expectations and unconscionability regarding insurance contracts in Nebraska remains in doubt. The Nebraska court has not addressed the
doctrine of reasonable expectations and has merely commented on
unconscionability by stating that the "visible marks" exclusion in
Cochran was not unconscionable. It remains to be seen whether
any such clause in a Nebraska insurance contract would be
deemed unconscionable.
The insured in Nebraska is left with two choices: (1) obtain
mysterious disappearance coverage and avoid the entire "visible
marks" issue, or (2) subject any theft recovery possibilities to the
intricacies of the applicability and construction of "visible marks"
exclusion clauses.
Bruce L. Hart '80

